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The aim of this paper is to investigate the likely future path of China’s metal intensity by 
referencing the experience of relevant peers through initial engagement with a 
technology-led strategy and beyond. This question cuts to the very roots of Chinese long 
run economic strategy and performance. The broad conclusion is that there is no ‘silver 
bullet’ quantitative model that captures the dynamics of metal intensity through the 
entirety of the industrialisation process. Even the identification of a robust non-linear 
long run relationship between steel intensity and income per capita in the United States, 
styled here as the “metal intensity Kuznets curve”, does not overturn this position. Each 
national industrialisation process, its entry into the global strategic transition and its 
relationship to metal intensity, appears to be sui generis and should be dealt with 
accordingly. China will not continue to follow a metal intensity path similar to Korea’s 
for more than another decade. After that point, similarities with the Japanese and United 
States’ experiences will increase, but a distinct Chinese character will develop. The peak 
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The aim of this paper is to shed light on China's future path of steel and base metal 
intensity by referencing the experience of relevant peers through their point of entry 
into the global strategic transition and beyond. Foreknowledge of China’s future metal 
demand is of direct relevance to the core constituencies of the world economy. 
Besides the Chinese themselves, such information is of immense strategic value to 
resource exporting nations and the global corporations that bestride them. China’s 
competitors for access to these resources – predominantly the world’s current and 
projected mega-states – are equally in need of such input to their own strategic 
decision making. It is an immensely practical task. 
 
Will China follow a path like Korea, who has stayed in the metal intensive sweet spot 
for a sustained period of time; or will it only briefly touch on the middle income sweet 
spot of metal intensity en route to the current resting place of the European economies 
and their offshoots? Will it eventually sit just on the more metal intensive side of the 
high income cohort, in a similar place to where Japan resides? These questions cut to 
the very roots of Chinese long run economic strategy and performance. The immense 
scale of China’s mega-state means that its strategic choices will generate substantial 
externalities that will require assertive responses from others. A better understanding 
of the path of metal intensity through time in a broader range of countries would be a 
great help to those tackling the immense task of meeting and responding to China’s 
long run metal demands. 
 
A broad conclusion of this paper is that China is unlikely to follow the Korean path 
once it moves deeper into middle income status. The superficially attractive 
correlation between the Korean and Chinese paths, based on limited time series, is 
perceived sceptically from the medium term point of view. The final path is likely to 
borrow from certain aspects of the experience of the United States and Japan, but the 
Chinese path will be distinctive. The United States is an apposite comparison as an 
economy built on a continental scale with a low population agglomeration ratio, while 
Japan is relevant due to the explosive but finite gains in world export share it enjoyed 
as its technological strategy unfolded, and the constraints that high population 
densities place on urban lifestyles. Together, these economies define some reasonable 
parameters for considering the Chinese case.  
 
While the United States and Japan are clearly relevant to a medium term assessment, 
evidence on metal intensity from these jurisdictions are not deterministic for our 
purposes. The sketch of Chinese metal intensity assembled here assumes a strong 
increase until the period of 2015 to 2020, a flattish peak emerging from 2020 to 2025, 
before an orderly decline develops in the second half of the 2020s. These dates are 
informed by Sino-specific analysis with pragmatic, selective input from historical 
case studies. 
 
The investigation presented below, that leads to the projection, argues that there is no 
"silver bullet" summary model that captures the dynamics of metal intensity through 
the entirety of the industrialisation process. The apparent non-linear association 
between development level and metal intensity, styled as the “metal intensity Kuznets 
curve” in this paper, may prove to be a siren’s song of cross sectional sample bias, 
like its progenitor. The true model of metal intensity must simultaneously capture 2 
flow, stock, cyclical and structural influences. That is a challenging task irrespective 
of data availability. In the presence of data constraints the task engenders pessimism.  
 
The national relationships between metal intensity and standard macroeconomic 
variables are complex and idiosyncratic. The firm implication from them is that each 
nation’s industrialisation process, which is triggered by its entry into the 
contemporary global strategic transition of technological change (Snooks 1999), and 
its relationship to metal intensity, is sui generis and should be treated as such. Any 
attempt to generalise across this field should proceed with extreme caution. 
Furthermore, data availability, particularly the absence of a definitive set of lengthy 
metal consumption time series suitable for comparative analysis inhibits a truly 
effective investigation of the issue. The most notable frustration here is the lack of 
information on the experience of major nations transitioning between emerging 
strategic status and membership of the strategic core. Future labour on this issue 
would be profitably directed towards constructing these basic time series for a 
representative sample of nations. While the investigation of intra-national (provincial) 
data on metal intensity has much to recommend it, as this stage the results derived 
should be regarded as tentative rather than conclusive. 
 
< figure 1 here >  
 
2. Global strategic transition, industrialisation & metal intensity 
 
This paper began by claiming that questions surrounding China’s future metal 
intensity “cut to the very roots of Chinese long run economic strategy and 
performance”. The meaning of this phase needs more formal clarification. This 
analysis is underpinned by a general dynamic theory that makes systematic sense of 
China’s rise in the broadest context. The framework adopted springs directly from the 
expansive canon of Graeme Snooks (1993, 1996, 1997, 1998a, 1998b, 1999). The 
general Snooksian model of global strategic transition (1999), a corollary of dynamic 
strategy theory (1996, 1997, 1998) are the core concepts applicable to this particular 
study.  
 
This section formally introduces the strategy function.    
 
O = f (N, K, R, T, E, SO, SL, SI)   (1) 
 
The strategic outcome, O, is proxied by gross domestic product (GDP). O is a 
function of strategic instruments: N is labour, K is the capital stock, R is natural 
resource endowment, T is the stock of available technology, tacit and realisable, E is 
economies of scale, and S is ‘strategic’, with subscripts O, L and I representing 
organizations, leadership
1 and ideas respectively (Snooks 1999: 219). 
 
Function (1) can be simplified to 
 
O = f (P, T, E,π)     (2) 
                                                 
1 Strategic leadership can come from any agents able to provide or control the signaling mechanisms in 
the economy that impact upon strategic confidence. The strategic administration (the bureaucracy and 
the executive) is the most important element of strategic leadership, but the role is not necessarily a 
state monopoly. In practice, any agent with an encompassing interest is a candidate. 3 
 
P represents the stock of physical inputs: labour, resources and capital. T and E are 
unchanged from their definitions in (1). The π signifies a vector comprised of the 
strategic variables SO, SL and SI.  Expanding further, π is an increasing function of 
strategic confidence (subscript C) and the price signal, strategic inflation (subscript 
P). 
 
π = f (SC, SP)       (3) 
 
So, the strategic outcome O relies upon physical factors, technological factors and 
strategic factors. The feedback mechanisms between these factors, which are 
determined by the strategic pursuits of materialist man (Snooks 1996), endow the 
model with dynamic characteristics. The underlying concept that allows the induction 
of the strategy function is that of strategic demand (Snooks 1998: 141-165). Strategic 
demand is the effective realizable desire of decision makers regarding the gamut of 
inputs relevant to their survival and prosperity. This driving force manifests itself in 
the pursuit of dynamic strategies and sub-strategies.  
 
The natures of the strategic factors that enter the function are time and context variant. 
They depend upon the technological underpinnings of the prevailing dynamic strategy 
and the sub-strategies that are pursued under its rubric. The nature of π under a 
conquest strategy will be very different to π in the context of a family multiplication 
strategy (Snooks 1996). The nature of π will depend on the creativity and risk appetite 
of the strategic decision makers involved, the problems they face and the mix of 
physical and technical factors available. The physical element of the equation is at the 
heart of this project. From this point forward, all discussion of π will be in the context 
of the contemporary global dynamic strategy of technological change.  
 
It is the spread of the dynamic strategy of technological change from the strategic core 
that drives the contemporary global strategic transition (Snooks 1999). The global 
strategic transition (hereafter GST) is the process whereby non- and anti-strategic 
countries are drawn into the “vortex” of technologically driven economic growth in 
the strategic core. The agents (in this case nation-states) in the strategic core are the 
leading exponents of the paradigm. They are easily recognised by their high levels of 
productivity per worker due to both depth and quality of capital stock and a 
consequently high standard of material well being. The advance of the GST, which 
lifts the absolute material conditions of new entrants and expands the markets 
available to incumbent technological strategists, brings global output closer to its 
potential level.  
 
The relevance of this framework to Chinese experience is obvious. China made a 
discretionary decision to engage with the GST in the late 1970s. The contours of this 
engagement have been detailed at length elsewhere (McKay 2008). The influx of 
technology from the leading strategic countries unleashed powerful forces of 
productivity enhancement within the economy. Output has been expanding ever since 
at a rate that implies a quadrupling in scale every twenty years. Per capita output has 
also expanded at extraordinarily impressive compound rates: faster even than the 4 
brilliant ascents of Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Greater China’s strategically-
inclined prodigals (Hong Kong under Britain and Taiwan under the Nationalists).
2 
 
Prior to engagement with the GST, Maoist China was an anti-strategic society. 
Nations in this category are unable or unwilling to unlock the synergy between the 
factors in the strategy function. Further, the non- or anti-strategic society is 
constrained by rent-seeking (redistributive) behaviour. Conversely the strategic 
society is propelled forward by profit-seeking (surplus producing) activity. Potential 
output in non- and anti-strategic societies is limited by their call on physical 
resources, the size of the internal market and a static and low-lying indigenous 
technological attainment. Potential output in strategic societies has a higher ceiling 
supported by economies of scale from specialization and servicing a global market, a 
greater call on resources through the ability to trade and a productivity premium 
conditioned byπ. In the language of growth accounting, strategic countries will 
achieve a higher rate of TFP. 
 
From the perspective of the task at hand, we are most interested in the dynamic 
feedback between China’s choices and the physical elements of its strategy function, 
specifically metals. We have some knowledge of this historical interaction in peer 
economies, the analysis of which forms a large portion of the remainder of the paper. 
Yet China’s future strategic choices will be time and context variant. The industrial 
technological paradigm is clearly closer to exhaustion now than when the United 
States, Japan or even Korea were all making similar decisions. The relative price of 
raw materials vis-à-vis manufactures in the early 21
st century tells us as much. 
China’s choices will suit their own demands and the environment in which they are 
made. Views from the outside, even direct experience on the precisely relevant theme 
is thereby rendered interesting rather than vital. 
 
3. Metal intensity in the United States: the case for the MIKC 
 
While cross sectional metal intensity data of recent vintage is available for a wide 
variety of countries at various levels of development (figure 1), we lack a 
comprehensive set of long time series of a representative sample of nations. What is 
available for comparative analysis is presented in figure 2. The longest national time 
series available is for steel use per capita in the United States. Here we analyse the US 
experience in the context of the Kuznets formulation. 
 
A Kuznets relationship is represented by a second order polynomial, with income per 
capita and its square term on the right hand side of the equation and the relevant 
development metric on the left. To test for this relationship in the metal field, we 
regress the Hodrick-Prescott filter of annual steel intensity per capita in the United 
States from 1929 to 2002 against the natural logs of the aforementioned right hand 
                                                 
2 It is worth noting that East Asia has been the most able adaptor of the benefits bestowed by GST 
entry since Western Europe and the United States adopted the technological strategy from Britain. The 
sequentially accelerating growth rates achieved by Asian countries as they enter the GST, exemplified 
by China, offers tentative support for the Snooks-Panov algorithm (Nazaretyan 2005). The Snooks-
Panov algorithm summarises the observed geometric acceleration of the time between the origin and 
exhaustion of technical paradigms in both human society and macro-life. That is a discussion for 
another day. 5 
side variables. For the relationship to be robust the estimated coefficients need to be 
opposite in sign and statistically significant.  
 
The empirical evidence in favour of a Kuznets relationship in the field of long run 
steel intensity in the United States is strong. Not only are the coefficients correctly 
signed and significant at the 1% level, the adjusted fit of the model is surprisingly 
high. We conduct the same test with the raw data and get broadly similar results.  
 
The results for all tests are presented in appendix table 1 and figures 3a and 3b. For 
the twentieth century United States at least, a MIKC seems to exist.  
 
< figures 2 & 3a & 3b here >  
 
4. A cautionary tale from the archives 
 
The finding that steel intensity in the United States during the twentieth century has 
followed an upside down U shape indicates that the Kuznets framework may be 
applicable to the entire metal intensity field. Unfortunately, the United States offers 
the only sufficiently lengthy time series enabling this proposition to be tested. The 
cross sectional data offers corroborating, if tentative evidence (figures 1 and 4). It is 
very tempting to use these apparent relationships to define a generalised path of metal 
intensity through the industrialisation process.  
 
< figure 4 here >  
 
Tempting yes, but the validity of such a methodology is highly debatable. Kuznets’ 
original observation of the upside down U in income per capita and income 
distribution space (Kuznets 1955), which became known as the Kuznets curve, is 
actually an egregious example of cross sectional bias. In similar fashion to our data on 
metal intensity, Kuznets had a patchy time series of US income distribution (plus the 
United Kingdom and Germany/Prussia/Saxony) and a cross section of information 
from a few countries at a spread of lower income levels.
3 These economies provided 
the hump in his hypothesized curve, “corroborating” the patchy time series evidence.  
 
Subsequent experience of East Asian trajectories following their entry into the GST in 
the quarter century following the second World War, where inequality was reduced 
between the low and middle income stages of development, has shown that the Latin 
American and South Asian paths observed by Kuznets are idiosyncratic rather than 
general. Indeed, the Latin trajectory was an outgrowth of poor planning decisions that 
ignored comparative advantage in favour of import substitution – an anti-strategic 
position (Lin 2008). The dual impediments of caste and colonial overlordship, which 
are redistributive strategies rather than surplus enhancing ones, seem sufficient to 
comprehend the South Asian case. These two models encouraged the super-normal 
growth of an anti-strategic rent seeking elite, with predictable outcomes for income 
distribution. Therefore, the original Kuznets curve is a cautionary tale for scholars of 
development looking to cross sectional data for predictive relationships. 
 
                                                 
3 Kuznets used data from India (1949/50), Ceylon (now Sri Lanka, 1950) and Puerto Rico (1948). 6 
The hump in our steel intensity curve is provided by two medium sized North Asian 
economies – Korea and Taiwan province (figure 1). They are both relatively new 
entrants to the GST, with their engagement occurring within the last half century. Are 
these economies typical or atypical? This judgement could validate or invalidate the 
cross section as representative, as we do not have readily available alternatives to 
substitute into the middle income space. Most development economists would choose 
the latter taxonomy if they were judging the case globally and the former if assessing 
the case regionally. This is a vexed issue that we will return to later in section 5. 
 
To be fair to Kuznets, who was the consummate empirical economist of his 
generation, he was “acutely conscious of the meagreness of the reliable information 
presented. The paper is perhaps 5 per cent empirical information and 95% 
speculation, some of it possible tainted by wishful thinking. The excuse for building 
an elaborate structure on such a shaky foundation is a deep interest in the subject and 
a wish to share it. The formal and no less genuine excuse is that the subject is central 
to much of economic analysis and thinking; that our knowledge of it is inadequate; 
that a more cogent view of the whole field may help channel our interests and work in 
intellectually profitable directions; that speculation is an effective way of presenting a 
broad view of the field; and that as long as it is recognized as a collection of hunches 
calling for further investigation rather than a set of fully tested conclusions, little harm 
and much good may result” (Kuznets 1955: 26). 
 
It is easy to agree and to empathise with some of the sentiments expressed in this 
disclaimer. Indeed, Kuznets might have been putting the case for a wider research 
agenda on metal intensity in the current day such is the overlap between his case and 
ours. However, the final assertion is somewhat problematic when the task at hand is a 
practical forecasting project that might guide real-world decision making. The 
absence of a general dynamic theory underpinning Kuznets’ hypothesizing is clearly 
limiting. 
 
The degree of harm from hypothesizing in the presence of severe data constraints 
might be stylized as a negative function of the maturity of the applied analysis that the 
original speculative ‘breakthrough’ attracts. The dynamic process of strategic 
imitation (Snooks 1996, 1997, 1998) predicts that a sophisticated and nuanced 
intellectual innovation will be quickly picked up by less able thinkers, and the nuance 
will often be lost. The application of a theory can even become misleading. A mixed 
example is the innovative extension of the Kuznetsian hypothesis into the 
environmental field (Grossman & Kruger 1995). This has been a lucrative and 
knowledge enhancing application. This branch includes a burgeoning literature on the 
applicability of the “environmental Kuznets curve” to China (Cai and Yang 2008, 
Bao, Chen and Song 2008, Bao and Peng 2006). Yet the debate has also highlighted 
the limitations of the framework as a generalisable forecasting system, with national 
deviations from the central model common, and only certain measures of pollution 
behaving in accordance with theory. That has not stopped some scholars from 
adopting the framework as a crude argument in favour of a passive approach to 
negative environmental externalities. 
 
It is extremely important the caveats presented here are recognized and understood 
from a forecasting perspective. The following section of the paper underscores this 
point. 7 
 
5. An aside on automobile penetration: why time series matter 
 
While cross sectional metal intensity data of recent vintage is available for a wide 
variety of countries at various states of engagement with the strategic transition, using 
this data alone has the potential to be highly misleading. A focus on comparative time 
series data is crucial to define the path from A (GST entry) to B (peak metal intensity) 
to C (membership of the strategic core). Cross sections can help with this task, but 
they can easily mislead rather than guide. The difficulty is that while a cross section 
may be able to define states of nature at A and C, the path between these two states 
may be hidden, and B identified erroneously, if the sample is imperfect.  
 
An instructive example of the potential problems associated with cross sectional data 
comes from the field of automobile penetration. Contemporary data on the number of 
passenger cars per 1000 persons for a wide variety of countries is readily available. In 
addition, there are time series for the United States (from 1929) and Japan (from 
1960). Ignoring the two time series for a moment, the cross sectional data implies that 
a simple linear association exists between income per capita and automobile 
penetration, with a clustering of observations in the lower left and upper right corners 
of the chart space (figure 5a).  
 
The time series tell a far richer story (figure 5b).  They indicate that the path between 
low and high automobile penetration may be concave (as in Japan) or convex (as in 
the US). Once again, we find that a reliance on relationships inferred solely from a 
cross section would lead to damaging forecasting errors. Recall the variables in the 
strategy function for a moment, and the difference between the Japan and American 
paths is clearly explicable. Japan is highly urbanised, densely populated and without a 
domestic oil resource. The United States is moderately urbanised, reasonably sparsely 
populated and it controls a great deal of oil. Japanese strategists were quite rational to 
follow the path they did and the Americans likewise. 
 
Here again, we are struck by the diversity of national experiences, rather than their 
similarity. The ability to ascribe any economy as “typical” seems very limited. Once 
again, we find little guidance on the transition between stages, with scant evidence 
from middle income locales. Forecasters operating in the automobile penetration field 
have realised this, and are projecting a non-linear, concave path for China. Two such 
forecasting projects (International Monetary Fund 2005, Westpac Economic Research 
2007) that generate similar results are re-produced in stylised form in figure 5c, 
alongside schematics of the Japanese and American experiences. 
 
There is a very practical reason why we should be interested in the time series on 
automobile penetration besides the aforementioned analogical and methodological 
considerations. In the interests of parsimony, we did not supplement the regression 
tests reported in section 2 with additional explanatory variables. The evidence for a 
Kuznetsian relationship in the historical steel intensity of the United States is 
comfortably sufficient when couched in the simplest of forms. However, when data 
on automobile penetration are included in the test (in original form and as a squared 
term) as additional information on the stage of development, the model improves on 
all metrics by a non-trivial margin. Most simply the adjusted R
2 (the “fit”) rises from 
0.63 to 0.71 and the standard error declines. (For estimation output, refer to table 1 in 8 
the appendix). Thus we can conclude that automobile penetration is an important 
measure for assessing both the general stage of economic development and the likely 
metal intensity of the economy. The augmented model of the MIKC for the United 
States is illustrated in figure 6. 
 
These conclusions add to the complexity of the original task. The presence of a 
Kuznets relationship in the long run steel intensity of the United States offered some 
hope that a generalisable relationship between metal demand and development level 
could be defined. The lack of long time series makes it difficult to test this hypothesis 
directly. There are two long time series in the field of automobile penetration: the 
United States and Japan. The presence of a relationship between metal intensity and 
automobile penetration raises hopes of an indirect test of the homogeneity of national 
paths. But as these two major countries followed such strikingly disparate paths 
regarding automobile penetration, we cannot infer or back-cast Japan’s metal intensity 
path using the United States example.   
 
6. Observations on the North Asian peer group 
 
The backbone of the comparative analysis of metal intensity within North Asia is 
table 1. China, Japan and Korea are its subject. Per capita consumption of steel, 
aluminium and copper (sourced from the IMF, units are kilograms) during their 
respective GST entry phases are benchmarked against macroeconomic variables that a 
priori are expected to have a relationship with metal intensity. 
 
< insert table 1 here > 
 
The macroeconomic variables chosen for the table are GDP per capita (under both 
PPP and market exchange rate weights); Industrial value added (IVA), % of GDP; 
Urban population as a share of total population; Exports of goods and services as a % 
of GDP; and Trade (exports plus imports) as a % of GDP; Merchandise exports, % of 
world exports; Gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) as a % of GDP; and Gross 
savings as a % of GDP.  
 
Keeping all of the caveats from the preceding sections of the chapter in mind, the 
following points have emerged from an investigation of the data that is available. 
They are all relevant to constructing an educated, if tentative guess about China's 
future trajectory.  
 
Industrial value-added (IVA) tends to peak as a share of GDP between income levels 
of $US10k and 15k per capita in PPP terms, and then decline. That accords with the 
observed peak in catch-up growth rates (deepening GST engagement) of 
approximately $US13k in late-coming East Asian countries (Garnaut et al 2008, 
Perkins and Rawski 2007). That said, China is an outlier in the sample with a high 
IVA share prior to GST entry, a relic of the self sufficient ethic that under-pinned the 
pre-1978 anti-strategic economy, and the price distortions that went along with the 
industrial bias of the command system.  
 
< insert figure 7 here > 
 9 
In contrast to the historical record on IVA, urbanisation tends to keep increasing well 
past middle income levels. It also tends to plateau rather than decline. That is almost 
certainly due to the fact that IVA loses ground to services activity, which thrives on 
agglomeration, rather than land intensive endeavours, which do not. In short, while a 
nation can develop to a post-industrial state, under the technological paradigm it does 
not develop to a post-urban state. Rather, it concentrates its population further. 
Evidence that the optimal city size increases with the institutional complexity that lags 
the strategic demands generated by technological change is littered through history 
(Snooks 1997). 
 
< insert figures 8 and 9 here > 
 
Degree of outward orientation and metal intensity are positively related. The most 
metal intensive economy in the sample, Korea, is a middle income export oriented 
manufacturer. It is also highly urbanised and has extremely high population density. 
Neither a plateau in its urbanisation rate and IVA share, nor a decline in its investment 
and savings rates, has handicapped its ability to raise metal intensity beyond the usual 
turning point between $10k and $15k per head. Its ability to continue gaining global 
market share beyond these points has enabled metal intensity to continue rising. 
Brazil, a low income economy with a weak outward orientation, is the counterpoint. 
 
< insert figures 10 and 11 here > 
 
China's metal intensity was relatively insensitive to the very early stages of GST entry 
and gains in export share. In the current decade though, metal intensity has become 
substantially more sensitive to development, catching and surpassing the comparable 
Japanese and then Korean rates. The low sensitivity seen in the early years is 
consistent with the conventional light to heavy industrial path pursued by many new 
GST entrants. In Japan and Korea metal intensity grew extremely rapidly in the 5 to 
15 years from GST entry, while the Chinese experience was less dramatic. China's 
surge comes in the 15 to 25 year era. This different may be partially attributable to the 




Copper and aluminium use have been more sensitive to the Asian industrialisation 
process than has steel use. This is perhaps due to the rapidly increasing degree of 
openness that has been a feature of Asian industrialisation; and the relative demands 
of the traded and non-traded sectors vis-à-vis ferrous and non-ferrous metals. Ferrous 
metals have a lower value to weight ratio than the non-ferrous complex and are 
therefore less likely to be traded. Further, as an economy ascends the value chain, 
high value-added durable goods will displace heavy industrial products in the output 
mix, raising the demand for non-ferrous vis-à-vis ferrous metals. While rural-urban 
migration underpins demand for housing, infrastructure and steel, the demands of 
                                                 
4 While an entry point for Korea in the early to middle 1960s is uncontroversial, Japan is a different 
case. Japan’s economic exploits prior to the Second World War are often discounted by non-specialists, 
but its industrial complex was strong enough to furnish a military force capable of defeating a 
European power (Russia) in a land and naval war in 1904/5. A late 1800s entry point, two generation 
after the first tier of European industrialisers, at 37% of Western European GDP/capita levels 
(Maddison 2003), would be quite reasonable. This is a debate for another day, but it underscores once 
again that the available data falls well short of the worthy task at hand. 10 
outward oriented manufacturing appear to be the stronger force at higher levels of 
income. 
 
Bringing these observations together, we can say that an economy engaged with the 
GST, with strong strategic leadership sponsoring industrial and technological 
progress, approaching the GDP per capita level consistent with a peak in industry 
share, in the midst of an urbanising trend, moving up the manufacturing value chain, 
making global market share gains and tapping external economies of scale, saving 
enough to rapidly build the capital stock without a binding external financing 
constraint, reaching an age of fixed and rotating capital stock where depreciation costs 
are non-trivial, with a willingness to increase population density and provide the 
requisite infrastructure to do so, and is moving to extend access to the key pillars of 
social and economic infrastructure to all its citizens might be fairly said to be in a 
metal intensity ‘sweet spot’. 
 
7. Foreign direct investment and long run constraints global on market share 
 
China’s high degree of openness to foreign direct investment (FDI) contrasts with 
Japan but gels with Korea. China’s rapid gains in world export market share have 
been primarily a function of the activities of foreign funded firms, particularly in the 
post-WTO accession era (figure 12). Trade fragmentation, with China serving the role 
of ‘assembler of first resort’, has amplified both the trend of foreign participation and 
the growth of export market share (Athukorala and Yamashita 2008). These 
observations open up another difficult forecasting problem. Korea has continued to 
expand its export market share almost uninterrupted and has achieved extremely high 
rates of metal intensity.  
 
China’s path of metal intensity to date is closest to the Korean experience. However, 
if inward FDI flows were to stabilise or decline (or another region assumed 
‘assembler of first resort’ status)
5 export market share could presumably do likewise, 
at least until an alternative strategy could be adopted (McKay 2008). That would 
prevent China from following the Korean path. Indigenous Korean firms have 
established themselves as globally competitive innovators in a number of sectors such 
as electronics and shipbuilding. Indigenous Chinese firms have yet to do so, and are 
probably at least a decade away from establishing strong brand awareness among non-
Chinese consumers. This perspective on the Chinese development path cautions 
against excessive reliance on the Korean example. 
 
China’s ability to continue expanding its world export share will surely be constrained 
by its enormous absolute scale and the resistance of its large trading partners. The 
strong penetration of Chinese-made imports is already a major political issue in the 
United States. The bilateral trade position is a rallying point for both sides of US 
                                                 
5 India, with its formidable labour supply profile, is the most commonly cited candidate for this role. A 
more likely outcome is that a group of competing low income, labour surplus economies will 
eventually displace China. In addition to India, long run Asian candidates include Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Indonesia, Vietnam and possibly emerging strategic states in North Korea and Myanmar. 
In 2050, the combined population of these countries excluding India is expected to be 1.1 billion 
(United Nations 2007). 11 
politics and the exchange rate is a lightning rod.
6 The historical example of the angst 
created by the bilateral balance between the US and Japan, and the USD/JPY 
exchange rate, is the obvious precedent. Over the coming decade, the expected 
appreciation of China’s nominal exchange rate, and a rise in the relative price level as 
administrative distortions are progressively removed and productivity catch-up 
continues, should appreciate the real exchange rate and reduce the current level of 
cost competitiveness enjoyed by the export sector.
7 At some point, China will be 
unable to seriously expect to expand its exports at a faster pace than aggregate world 
demand. Korea’s small size offers it the luxury of continuing to follow a strategy led 
by export manufacturing at income levels far higher than a larger economy – let alone 
a mega-state like China (Snooks 1997) – would find obstacles placed in its path. 
 
China will clearly be constrained in its choices to some extent by the strategic 
activities of its competitors. The attitudes of governments to Chinese purchases of 
mineral resources in their domains will eventually become as important as access for 
Chinese exports is in the current phase. This area has already become contentious, 
with a Chinese principal prevented from purchasing an energy asset in the United 
States, and the presence of great angst within Australia regarding direct inroads into 
the resource sector by Chinese investors (Drysdale and Findlay 2008). 
 
8. Does intra-national convergence hold the key? 
 
A provincial approach to the Chinese data on metal intensity has the potential to 
eventually remedy the shortcomings of the national datasets.
8 The provincial data also 
tentatively support a Kuznets style metal intensity path. It is eminently reasonable to 
assume that there is a high level of relevant information content in the paths already 
traced by China’s wealthier provinces that are most actively engaged with the 
technological strategy.   
 
This field of endeavour is particularly promising, but it does rely to a degree on the 
arguable assumption that China’s wealthiest provinces have already defined a 
structural peak in metal intensities from which they are declining. In other words, they 
are beyond the “turning point”
 9 of an implicit Chinese MIKC. It may be that observed 
reductions in the metal intensity of the Beijing and Shanghai economies are the 
beginning of a transition to a more cyclically informed usage, and therefore may 
represent local rather than absolute maxima. After all, income levels in Beijing and 
Shanghai are still only a quarter of present US levels, implying that they are hardly at 
a level of productivity consistent with membership of the strategic core. The US 
experience of metal intensity makes this point about local versus global maxima in a 
number of historic contexts. High amplitude cyclicality was the norm throughout the 
twentieth century (chart 3b).  
 
                                                 
6 For multiple perspectives on China’s exchange arrangements, see McKay (2007), Gang (2006), 
Goldstein (2004), Eichengreen (2004), Frankel (2004), Prasad et al (2005) and McKinnon (2006).  
7 See Golley and Tyers (2007) for an examination of the dynamics of the real exchange rate. They 
argue that the depreciating impact of high domestic savings has more than offset a vector of 
appreciating factors, leading to the somewhat surprising depreciation of the real rate over the last 
decade.  
8 A provincial approach to environmental problems, utilising a non-linear framework, is also bearing 
fruit (Cai and Du 2008, Bao, Chen and Song 2008, Bao and Peng 2006). 
9 This is not to be confused with a Lewisian turning point (Garnaut and Song 2006a, 2006b). 12 
It might also be argued that Shanghai and Beijing are atypical observations. If these 
top tier cities are treated as outliers, then it creates problems for cross sectional 
analysis, because without them the Kuznets relation is far from clear. If these cities 
are excluded, then it would be prudent to wait for a broader selection of provinces to 
mature in their steel usage before attempting to define a definitive turning point for an 
economy as diverse as China.   
 
The proclivity of high income countries to maintain an elevated if somewhat reduced 
metal consumption pattern well beyond the peak in industrialisation implies that stock 
effects become a progressively more significant determinant of metal demand. The 
analysis presented here could therefore be augmented by data on relative capital 
stock, or levels of flow investment which take account of the ongoing costs of 
depreciating and replacing fixed and rotating capital. Further, the metal intensity of 
fixed investment may rise as higher levels of technology are attained and households 
demand more sophisticated products. House sizes increase with income (raising 
ferrous input), they become more ‘wired’ (raising non-ferrous input) and structurally 
sound (again raising ferrous input). Deepening the social infrastructure stock brings 
initial demand for wiring and piping and then on-going maintenance requirements. It 
therefore seems obvious that models of metal intensity that focus solely on “flow” 
variables will be incomplete. Each of these arguments is relevant to the provincial 
analysis of Chinese metal intensity, as well as the study of metal intensity across 
countries. 
 
9. Whither China? 
 
It remains to make an assessment of what the Chinese path of metal intensity will 
look like. The reasoning in sections 6 and 7 indicates that while China may look like 
Korea now, it is unlikely to do so at higher income levels. The main constraint is this 
regard will be China’s inability to follow an export-led strategy in the same way that 
Korea has done.  
 
China’s continental land mass represents a major contrast with the compact nature of 
the Japanese archipelago and the Korean peninsula. The United States is a far better 
comparison in this regard. The United States’ effort to build an internal mega-market 
with a continental transport system linking a multitude of metropolitan nodes tallies 
well with China’s existing plans to expand inter-provincial commerce via the 
construction of an ambitious national road and rail network.  
 
The density of population in China is far higher than in the United States at any point 
in its history. Therefore, while China will have a national inter-city transport network 
similar to that of the United States, intra-city transit systems will presumably develop 
very differently. China is therefore less likely to develop cities characterised by 
suburban sprawl that rely upon automobiles. Rather, it will borrow from Japanese and 
European models of mass public transit. One study (McKinsey Global Institute 2008) 
estimates that China will construct 170 mass transit systems by 2025, servicing the 
majority of a projected 221 urban agglomerations with populations in excess of one 
million people. This projected style of urbanisation reinforces the assessment that 
China’s future path of automobile penetration will not resemble that of the United 
States.  
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China’s on-going urbanisation drive is proceeding on a scale that does not have a 
precedent. The westward expansion of the population of the United States (a family 
multiplication strategy rather than a technological theme focussing on a rural-urban 
shift [Snooks 1997: chapter 12]), or the mass Siberian migration of European 
Russians (ibid: 442-6) are tempting but not terribly productive analogies. These two 
historical examples were based around physical resource acquisition and exploitation. 
In China’s case, labour is moving to expedite the diffusion of the technological 
strategy, not to exploit untapped physical resources. The combination of immense 
scale and a distinct strategic underpinning argue that this particular factor must be 
considered on its own merit without the benefit of firm historical guidance. 
 
The aforementioned factors – external saturation, internal integration, mass 
urbanisation, urban style (alongside an anticipated path for income per capita) - must 
guide our medium term judgement. The United States is a reasonable comparison in 
some, Japan in others. At times though China’s uniqueness shines like a beacon.  
 
Some milestones and relevant trajectories can be defined to give some idea of the 
timing of the peak in Chinese metal intensity. China should reach the $13k per capita 
income level around 2015, if it continues to expand at the rates projected by growth 
accountants, and the demographers at the UN have done their sums correctly (Perkins 
and Rawski 2007, Wang 2007, Garnaut et al 2008, He et al 2007, United Nations 
2007). Given its distance from the strategic leadership will still be substantial at this 
point (around 20% of US GDP per capita), a relative level well below that at which 
other East Asian countries began to experience decelerating growth (Garnaut et al 
2008), we might reasonably consider 2015 as the earliest possible time that per capita 
growth would begin to decline. And indeed, we note that the ‘turning point’ in the 
general MIKC represented by the cross sectional data in figure 4, for what it is worth, 
is around $24k per capita. In the MIKC estimated for the United States, the turning 
point was around $17k per capita. China cannot be reasonably expected to reach 
either point any sooner than 2023 or 2019 respectively.  
 
Further to those points, the five year period 2015 to 2020 is the turning point for 
China’s demographic profile as projected by the United Nations population division 
(United Nations 2007).
10 The momentum of urbanisation will also have calmed by 
this time, with 72 million rural to urban migrants anticipated in the five years to 2020, 
down 10% from the estimated peak rate of the 2005 to 2010 period. By the five years 
to 2030, the rate of urbanisation will have declined by 38% from peak rates, with the 
urban share of the population surpassing 60%, equivalent to the global average. 
 
The saturation point for the global economy regarding China’s exports is another core 
factor to consider. This was done in section 7 with specific reference to differentiating 
China and Korea. Here we consider the Japanese example. Japan’s export share grew 
in trend terms through most of the Bretton Woods era, paused during the mid 1970s as 
energy exporters reigned, and then continued its ascent all the way up to the Plaza 
Accord of 1985. At this point Japanese GDP per capita had reached three quarters of 
the United States’ level (it would peak around 85% in 1991); it had been the world’s 
second largest economy for sixteen years; and the real exchange rate had more than 
                                                 
10 For an analysis of the demographic profile, and an application to the long run growth trajectory, see 
Golley and Tyers 2006. 14 
doubled in value since the yen was de-pegged from the US dollar. Further nominal 
and real yen appreciation beyond 1985 resulted in a loss of competitiveness and 
precipitated a trend decline in Japan’s export share in the second half of the 1980s. 
Japan also had nowhere else to go from a sectoral perspective. By this stage Japanese 
firms defined the technological frontier in many sectors. It became clear that Japan 
could no longer seriously expect to sustain export growth faster than the rate of 
growth in aggregate world trade. As its cost competitiveness eroded, increasingly it 
was unable to do even that. Japan’s externally focused development strategy had 
exhausted (McKay 2008). 
 
If these broad economic (as opposed to political) themes and relativities need to be 
replicated in the Chinese instance before we reach the saturation point for world 
export market share, then we are some way from reaching such a peak. China will be 
only reach two fifths of US GDP per capita levels by 2030, a level not far removed 
from the Japanese position in the mid 1960s. Japan was expanded its export share for 
two decades beyond this landmark. Further, China’s real exchange rate has only just 
embarked upon an appreciating trajectory. The economy has only recently exited a 
protracted disinflationary period. Modest flexibility was introduced into the nominal 
exchange rate regime as recently as July 2005 (Golley and Tyers 2007, McKay 2007). 
It seems unlikely that the level of the real exchange rate will present a major hurdle 
for Chinese export market share gains for a significant period of time. 
 
China’s world export market share is approaching the levels at which Japan’s share 
peaked. But as China is still increasing its share of world output extremely rapidly, 
that growth accommodates a higher natural share of global export trade. China is 
likely to be the largest, if not the richest economy in the world. It will become far 
larger in relative terms than Japan was when it achieved a 9% share of world exports. 
As we argued in section 7, the growth in China’s export share will submit to gravity at 
a GDP per capita level well below that currently prevailing in Korea, but it will not 
face the economic hurdles that constrained Japan any time soon. If we recognise that 
the politics of the situation are relevant, then it may be that China finds that rapid 
global market share gains cease well ahead of the schedule facing a ‘normal’ 
economy. Even a very pessimistic reading of the situation would put that point deep 
into the next decade, or possibly early in the 2020s.   
 
The United States increased its share of world merchandise exports from around 3% 
in 1800 to 9.8% in 1860, 13.2% by 1900 and 16% in 1960
11 (Lipsey 2000: table 15.1 
p. 688). Clearly, gains in world export share can continue for a very long time before 
the global economy becomes saturated with the output of a large and expanding 
strategic state.  
 
As discussed in section 5, Chinese auto penetration is anticipated to follow a path that 
is moderate by either Japanese or American standards. The International Monetary 
Fund’s projections for auto ownership per 1000 persons incorporate a 250% 
expansion between 2010 and 2020, and a 180% rise between 2020 and 2030 
(International Monetary Fund 2005: 182). A non-linear interpolation of these points 
results in the path presented in figure 5c. At 267 cars per 1000 people, China would 
                                                 
11 The figure for 1960 is the author’s calculation from World Bank data accessed via subscription to the 
World Development Indicators database. All other data on historical United States exports are taken 
from the in text reference. 15 
be less than half of the way to the saturation point observed elsewhere. That implies 
that further automobile penetration beyond that point would contribute to keeping 
Chinese metal intensity at a relatively high level beyond the turning point. 
 
The preceding discussion sketches a very broad range within which various factors 
relevant to China’s intensity of steel use might peak: as early as 2015 and as late as 
2030. It seems fairly safe to trim this distribution at the near end. The idea of resource 
intensive high growth decelerating as soon as 2015, at such low levels of relative 
income, relative capital stock, in the midst of the urbanisation drive and prior to the 
peak in export market share does not seem plausible. However, we might reasonably 
see the 2015 to 2020 period as the likely moment when China conclusively veers off 
the Korean trajectory and begins to define a more distinctive individual path with a 
flatter gradient of increase. 
 
If we allow China to follow Korea up to 2015, when we assume Chinese income per 
capita has reached $13k, then that would imply steel consumption of 700kg per 
capita, or 910 million metric tons. That is equivalent to 80% of global steel output in 
2005. A demand profile like that will obviously put extreme pressure on global supply 
potential. It may encourage substitution decisions, and it may crowd out smaller 
consumers. In sum, if China was to follow this path, other countries may have to 
review their own strategies to cope, whether they are net importers or net exporters of 
resources. 
 
The supply response to the strategic demands of the Chinese development process 
will be critical to the final outcome. A strategic price signal, in the form of the 
spectacular commodity price rises observed since 2003, is starkly evident, so the 
incentive to invest is currently very large. The dominant players in supplying the 
market, the major global diversified resources companies, are trumpeting their ability 
to meet huge projected Chinese demands (Albanese 2008, Kloppers 2008). Taking 
that claim on board, while simultaneously recognising the unpredictable nature of the 
exploration and discovery process and the oligopolistic nature of the industry, and 
there is no reason to presume that excess supply of raw materials will emerge in a 
sustainable fashion in ferrous metals markets. That will keep prices elevated relative 
to historical norms and continue to drive the strategic demand for future investment. 
That indicates that presuming the resource endowment exists, it will be progressively 
utilised by strategists over the period. Thus we assume that China’s choices will not 
be curtailed by finite supply.   
 
The 2015 to 2020 period represents a transition phase in the projection, with the 
structural drivers becoming more erratic and beginning to blend more frequently with 
cyclical factors to determine metal demand. The precise peak in Chinese steel usage 
per capita would thus occur somewhere within a few years of 2020, with the 
distribution of likely outcomes skewed towards the later dates in this range.  
 
Importantly, it must be acknowledged that demand would become significantly more 
volatile around the turning point. The experience of the United States highlights that 
once cyclical factors become a material determinant of per capita steel usage, the path 
of annual observations describes a violent saw tooth pattern. The gradient of the 
underlying trend is likely to flatten appreciably once China moves assertively away 
from the Korean course. It may even flatten absolutely. This seems more likely than a 16 
trend of swift erosion in the intensity of steel usage on the far side of the turning 
point. Given that the broad range initially defined stretched all the way out to 2030, 
and the huge uncertainties at play, a hedging forecast allows for a flat trend for a time 
following the tentatively defined peak.  
 
That leaves a profile of Chinese steel usage per capita that looks something like the 
schematic diagram presented as figure 13 below. The discontinuities of the curve are 
defined as follows: 
 
a) 700kgs per capita in 2015 b) 750kgs per capita in 2019 c) 750kgs per capita in 
2023 d) 550kgs per capita in 2030.   
 
< figure 13 here > 
 
10. Summary & conclusions 
 
Attempting to sketch China’s future path of metal intensity is not possible without 
first assessing its overall strategic attitudes towards a multitude of issues, both 
domestic and international. The study began by stating that there is no “silver bullet” 
model of metal intensity. Even the presence of a robust Kuznetsian relationship in the 
United States between steel intensity and income per capita, which was documented 
in section 2 as the MIKC, does not overturn this statement. The corroboration of the 
MIKC in cross sectional data does not necessary buttress the case. The two findings 
are both useful, but together they do not provide us with a general model that may be 
confidently applied to forecasting problems. Kuznets himself warned against 
speculating beyond one’s data. Over reaching is an ever present risk when the data 
itself is frustratingly sparse. 
 
The example of comparative long run automobile penetration in the United States and 
Japan, a metric that was shown to be statistically relevant to explaining steel use in the 
former, highlights the idiosyncratic rather than common elements of national 
strategies. The contrasting paths to high automobile penetration observed in the 
United States and Japan indicates that we must be extremely cautious about back-
casting existing time series with a relationship based on either a) a time series from a 
single country, or b) a cross section of multiple countries where the “hump” in the 
MIKC may be generated by atypical observations. Or worse, we could be relying on a 
cross section of strategic and anti-strategic nations, where the experiences of the latter 
are not relevant for the former. 
 
In conclusion, the data presented in this paper offer a broad range of perspectives on 
the change in metal intensity at various distances from GST entry. Some tentative 
generalisations have emerged as have some important findings for individual 
countries. However, there are shortcomings in using either the general-to-specific or 
the specific-to-general approaches in a forecasting framework.     
 
As for China’s future path of metal intensity, it seems unlikely that it will continue to 
resemble Korea beyond 2015 or so. The post 2015 trajectory will feature certain 
aspects that are reminiscent of the paths taken by the United States and Japan, but the 
final outcome will not fully resemble either. As a tentative and preliminary 
judgement, and assuming that resource limits are not reached, the peak in Chinese 17 
steel usage per capita is likely to occur at a point not too distant from 2020: possibly 
sooner, but more likely to be later. The peak level of steel intensity induced from the 
analysis is 750kgs per capita. That is well below Korean levels of consumption, but 
close enough to Japan’s peak rate. It is suggested that this peak will be sustained 
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$US/capita kg/capita kg/capita kg/capita %GDP %GDP %GDP %GDP %GDP % % persons mkt $/cap
Japan 1960 0 5115 na 3.3 1.6 na 34 34 11 21 3.2 43 258 7099
5 7614 na 4.4 3.0 na 34 33 11 20 4.6 47 270 10566
10 12435 na 7.9 8.8 na 41 40 11 20 6.3 53 285 17298
15 14424 42 7.4 10.5 42 33 33 13 23 6.5 57 305 20135
20 17058 41 9.9 14.0 41 32 33 14 26 6.5 60 319 23917
25 19129 40 10.2 14.0 40 32 29 14 23 9.3 61 331 26940
30 23599 40 12.8 19.6 40 34 33 10 17 8.3 63 339 33280
35 25019 34 11.3 18.6 34 30 28 9 15 8.6 65 344 35322
Memo
Years from GST entry GDP ppp Steel use Copper use Alum. Use IVA  Savings  GFCF  Exports  Goods Trade  World export share Urban pop  Pop per km^2 GDP mkt $/cap
index index index index index index index index index index index index index
Korea 1974 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
5 130 173 221 173 125 119 120 114 110 152 118 108 129
10 179 283 511 349 134 152 107 119 112 276 135 116 176
15 263 557 760 841 142 181 138 88 90 325 154 122 266
20 365 937 1203 1464 143 181 139 93 88 421 163 128 368
25 435 975 1844 1710 139 169 116 126 114 464 166 133 437
Memo
Years from GST entry GDP ppp Steel use Copper use Alum. Use IVA  Savings  GFCF  Exports  Goods Trade  World export share Urban pop  Pop per km^2 GDP
$US/capita kg/capita kg/capita kg/capita %GDP %GDP %GDP %GDP %GDP % % persons mkt $/cap
Korea 1974 0 3722 84 1.0 1.0 29 20 27 30 57 0.6 48 357 2489
5 4848 146 2.2 1.8 37 24 32 34 62 0.9 57 386 3221
10 6649 237 5.1 3.6 39 31 29 36 64 1.6 65 413 4386
15 9792 468 7.6 8.6 42 36 37 26 51 1.9 74 434 6615
20 13597 787 12.0 15.0 42 37 37 28 50 2.4 78 457 9159
25 16172 819 18.3 17.5 41 34 31 38 65 2.7 80 476 10884
Notes: GST entry dates are China 1978, Japan 1960 and Korea 1974. The Korean results are very sensitive to the choice of starting point. Copper and aluminium consumption available from 1960, steel from 1974. 
PPP GDP and metal consumption data from the International Monetary Fund, prior to ICP 2008. All other data from the World Bank. * Industrial value added. Table 1a: Estimation output related to the data presented in figure 3a. Table 1b: Estimation output related to the data presented in figure 3b.
Dependent variable: Hodrick-Prescott filter of US steel use per capita (t) Dependent variable: Unadjusted data of US steel use per capita (t)
Sample: 1929 to 2002 Sample: 1929 to 2002
Observations: 74 Observations: 74
Method: OLS Method: OLS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
Y 0.6938 0.0464 14.9452 0.0000 Y 0.7551 0.0740 10.2053 0.0000
Y2 -0.0398 0.0028 -14.4674 0.0000 Y2 -0.0434 0.0044 -9.8894 0.0000
C -2.5770 0.1922 -13.4103 0.0000 C -2.8347 0.3063 -9.2545 0.0000
R-squared 0.787355     Mean dependent var 0.37473 R-squared 0.6308     Mean dependent var 0.3747
Adjusted R-squared 0.781365     S.D. dependent var 0.07908 Adjusted R-squared 0.6204     S.D. dependent var 0.0957
S.E. of regression 0.036976     Akaike info criterion -3.717379 S.E. of regression 0.0589     Akaike info criterion -2.7849
Sum squared resid 0.097075     Schwarz criterion -3.623971 Sum squared resid 0.2466     Schwarz criterion -2.6915
Log likelihood 140.5430     F-statistic 131.4448 Log likelihood 106.0429     F-statistic 60.6629
Durbin-Watson stat 0.0934     Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 Durbin-Watson stat 0.9411     Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000
Y is US GDP per capita; Y2 is its squared term; C is a constant. Y is US GDP per capita; Y2 is its squared term; C is a constant.
Y is entered as a natural log Y is entered as a natural logTable 1c: Estimation output related to the data presented in figure 6.
Dependent variable: Unadjusted data of US steel use per capita (t)
Sample: 1929 to 2002
Observations: 74
Method: OLS
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
Y 0.6458 0.1239 5.2126 0.0000
Y2 -0.0354 0.0067 -5.2648 0.0000
AU 3.3692 0.8586 3.9241 0.0002
AU2 -0.3001 0.0731 -4.1031 0.0001
C -11.8872 2.1825 -5.4466 0.0000
R-squared 0.7287     Mean dependent var 0.3747
Adjusted R-squared 0.7130     S.D. dependent var 0.0957
S.E. of regression 0.0513     Akaike info criterion -3.0389
Sum squared resid 0.1813     Schwarz criterion -2.8832
Log likelihood 117.44     F-statistic 46.3339
Durbin-Watson stat 1.26     Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000
Y is US GDP per capita; Y2 is its squared term; C is a constant.
AU is automobiles per 1000 persons; AU2 is its squared term.
Y and AU are entered as natural logs.